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MIGRATION AND TRADE POLICIES: SYMMETRY OR
PARADOX?
Jagdeep S. Bhandari*

1. INTRODUCTION
Other than national security and international terrorism, few issues
appear to have occupied the attention of the public and of policy makers to a

larger extent than migration, in particular irregular migration (migration
irreguliere)and to a smaller extent, international commerce and globalization.'
Heightened concern about these issues (aside from the customary concerns
about intensely local matters such as school education and medical care) may be
observed both in the liberal democracies of Western Europe and the United
States ("U.S."), as well as in other parts of the world, including Asia and Africa.
Indeed, election results in the U.S. in 2008 are likely to be molded to a
substantial extent by the issue of migration. In Europe, political parties with
strong positions on immigration and asylum have led to the emergence of a
"radical right" and such parties in France, Denmark, Austria and Germany

among others, have reported strong electoral gains.2

Professor of Law; Florida Coastal School of Law, Jacksonville, Florida.
See World Public Opinions: Program on International Policy Attitudes, at
www.worldpublicopinion.org; Ipsos Group for the U.K.,
http://www.ipsosmori.com/polls/2003/migration.shtm; Migration Watch,
www.rnigrationwatchuk.org; Pew Research Center and National Public Radio,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5312922.
2 Profile, Jean-MarieLe Pen, BBC NEWS, April 23, 2002, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1943193.stm. In France, the National Front Party of Jean-Marie
Le Pen captured about 17 percent of the presidential vote in early 2002. Id. While in Austria, the
far-right Freedom Party of Jitrg Haider gained seats in the Austrian coalition government shortly
before that. Austria and the HaiderFactor: Special Report, BBC NEWS, May 4, 2000, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/62852I.stm. Similar results are reported for the anti-immigration
Danish People's Party ("DPP") with respect to seats in the Danish Parliament (the Folketing) and the
National Democratic Party ("NDP") (successor party to the Deutsche Reichspartei)in Germany.
Roland Nelles and Gabor Steingart. Rise of German Right-Wing PartyEvokes Ghosts of Past,
SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L, Jan. 31, 2005, at
http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,339604,00.html. For more detailed discussion,
see TERRI GIVENS, VOTING RADICAL RIGHT IN WESTERN EUROPE (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press) (2005) and SIMON GREEN, THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION: INSTITUTIONS AND
IMMIGRATION POLICY IN CONTEMPORARY GERMANY (Manchester University Press) (2004).
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Although "globalization," in particular "corporate globalization," has
preoccupied the public to a large extent, free trade has had a somewhat lower
profile than migration in most countries. In the U.S., trade issues remain of
concern to specific sectors and groups that perceive an economic threat to
themselves but, perhaps owing to its more ubiquitous nature, not since the days
of NAFTA (North America Free Trade Agreement) in 1993-94 has the
American populace focused to a large extent on free trade pacts.3 Moreover,
trade and migration are not popularly viewed in the U.S. as being intimately
related. 4 In Europe however, at least for policy-makers, trade and migration are
not viewed dichotomously. In particular, with respect to accession vel non to the
European Union treaty, which in principle assures free mobility of both goods
and persons (in addition to the other two "freedoms" involving movement of
services and of capital).5
Concern over the undesirable linkage between trade and migration,
though expected to be temporary, is the precise reason why the core members of
the European Union have delayed the full freedom of labor rights for new
members such as Bulgaria and Romania. The latter countries joined the Union
on January 1, 2007, but will not have full free movement of labor privileges for
a five year period (i.e. until 2012). Thus, while the original core European
3 NAFTA became effective on January 1, 1994. The larger Central American Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA-DR), which includes five Central American nations, the Dominican Republic
and the U.S., has delayed its original final implementation date. CentralAmerican Free Trade
Agreement Misses Implementation Date, GLOBAL EXCHANGE,
http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/cafta/. The even more ambitious Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA) Agreement also appears stalled for now. U.S. Seeks Trade and Investment
Agreement with Panama - With FTAA Stalled, U.S. Engages in NAFTA Extension Piece by Piece,
COMMON DREAMS PROGRESSIVE NEWSWIRE, April 26, 2004, at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_- Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/SectionIndex.html.
4 During the debates leading to the ratification of NAFTA, some public officials and commentators
had discussed the linkage between the trade pact and its consequences in mostly favorable terms,
i.e., that the enactment of NAFTA would likely stem migration flows to the U.S. from Mexico. See
Honorable Gene McNary, U.S. Comm'r for the INS, Moving Goods and People in International
Commerce, Duke University (Feb. 6, 1992) in 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 247, 247 (1992). ("1 feel
more than a bit confident in acknowledging that, if immigration is not formally on the table,
someone at the table will sooner or later realize as a practical matter that moving goods and services
in international commerce involves moving people who trade in these goods and services."). Other
commentators, who may have proven more accurate, believed that NAFTA would exacerbate
migration from Mexico to the U.S. in the short run, i.e., that there would likely exist a "migration
hump." See PHILIP MARTIN, NAFrA AND MEXICO-U.S. MIGRATION (2005),
http://giannini.ucop.edu/Mex-USMigration.pdf.
5 See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty of Rome, OJ 1997 C340/173, Art. 3.1(c). See
Roger Goebel, The European Union in Transition:The Treaty office in Effect; Enlargement in
Sight: A Constitution in Doubt, 27 FORDHAM INT. L.J. 455 (2004) (discussing the various
amendments to the original European Community Treaties and associated protocols).
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Union members (West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and The
Netherlands) pursued both free trade and free migration among each other, trade
and migration policies6 have been dichotomized for many recent entrants into the
Union for the present.
What is the relationship between international migration and trade? Is
liberalized trade likely to create or diminish incentives for additional migration?
In the former case, trade and migration may be said to be complements and in
the latter case, substitutes. If increased trade diminishes the incentives to
migrate, then the present objectives of most developed nations of fostering free
trade while restricting inbound migration could well be accomplished by the use
of trade policy alone. Have policy makers and governments acted as though
trade and migration policies were really different sides of the same economic
coin? Are governments in more democratic societies more likely to be proimmigration and pro-trade or conversely compared with less liberal
democracies? Are the preferences (to the extent that meaningful franchise
exists) of voters between trade and migration symmetrical, i.e. does being protrade normally imply that the voter in question is also likely to be promigration? What has been the impact of interest groups or coalitions of voters
on articulated trade and migration policies historically? These are some of the
several questions addressed in this multi-disciplinary article.
It will be observed that over the last two centuries, trade and migration
policies have never been simultaneously liberal. One century ago, the policy
mix was marked by relatively restrictive tariffs and a liberal migration regime.
Shortly after the end of the Second World War, most advanced countries
underwent a radical policy switch to one characterized by the opposite
configuration of a liberalized trading order increasing restrictive migration
policies. Simultaneous free trade and international labor mobility have, in fact,
never existed over the past two hundred years, although there are periods during
which labor and capital mobility have coexisted.
In what follows, the relationship between trade and migration policies
will be examined, both on the basis of received doctrine in a number of
disciplines and as actually implemented in most advanced countries. Work
currently available in a number of fields, notably, law, economics, political
science, public choice and to some extent, sociology and international relations
are utilized. Broad interdisciplinary work of this type is still very much the
exception and some of the analysis and conclusions should be regarded, at

6 See for example the release by the German Federal Foreign Office mentioning transitional periods
for certain freedoms for the newest entrants to the European Uninon, Romania and Bulgaria on
January 1, 2007 at http://www.huliq.com4162/bulgaria-and-romania-new-member-states-of-theeuropean-union.
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present, as being tentative.
If there is a firm conclusion that may be reached it is this: All too
often, authors in various disciplines, including law, appear to have unreservedly
accepted the conclusions and
Implications of naive (meaning of the vintage variety) economic
frameworks that predict that trade and migration are interchangeable
phenomena, in other words, countries can either trade goods or persons and the
consequences are very similar. In fact though, trade and migration are quite
different even with respect to purely economic implications and profoundly
distinguishable in their non-economic, socio-political causes and consequences
and there may not be any necessary close linkage between them. In this respect,
the chorus of hand-wringing by a number of authors, notably in the law,
regarding the "missed opportunities" for migration reform that should have
been grafted on to the NAFTA accords is misplaced.7
Because of the scope and breadth of the present work, fuller details and
exposition of some of the analysis must be left to a much longer paper. Where
possible, the article attempts to simplify and abstract from unnecessary
complexity in order to appeal to readers across a broad spectrum of interests and
disciplines.

II. LAW
Unlike some areas such as Constitutional Law, Commercial Law and
Criminal Law, or the Law of Evidence, legal doctrine by itself has no
autonomous content and implications for social policy, either with respect to

7 See, Melinda McGehee, Using Immigration as ProtectionistMechanism While PromotingFree

Trade, 8 L & Bus. REV. AM. 667 (2002); Alan Nelson, NAFTA: Immigration Issues Must be
Addressed, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 987 (1994); James Smith, NAFTA and Human Rights: A
Necessary Linkage, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 793 (1994); Dolores Acevedo & Thomas Espenshade,
Implicationsof a North America Free Trade Agreement for Mexican Migrationinto the United
States, 18 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 729, 730-31 (1992) (observing, "[in absence of protectionism,
trade among countries with different factor endowments is a substitute for migration. In other
words, if countries with an abundance of labor can specialize in the production of labor-intensive
goods, there need not be labor migration to more developed countries."). In a well-cited paper Kevin
Johnson observes that the dichotomy between trade and movement of people in the NAFTA is a
"false separation" since "labor migration and capital flow are related to international trade ... [and
that] .... [iln the absence of protectionism, trade among countries with different factor endowments
is a substitute for migration") (emphasis in original). Kevin Johnson, Free Trade and Open Borders:
NAFTA and Mexican Immigration to the United States, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 937, 965 (1994); see
also Howard Chang, LiberalizedImmigration and Free Trade: Economic Welfare and Optimal
ImmigrationPolicy; 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1997); Howard Chang, Migration as International
Trade, 12 U.C.L.A. J. INT'L L & FOREIGN AFF. 371 (1998-99).
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international trade or international migration (of persons or of capital).8
Virtually every independent nation has a body of law relating to external trade
and migration, both "on the books" (as it is written) and as practiced or actually
enforced. 9 As alluded to above, public debates have often centered around
perceived deficiencies of the legal regime, particularly, as enforced. For
instance, current immigration debates in the U.S. have focused on the some 12
million or so undocumented aliens (irregular migrants) currently residing in the
U.S.' While such persons are subject to deportation and while U.S. employers
employing any such persons are subject to civil and criminal sanctions, the
overwhelming practical reality is that no such enforcement occurs in practice
for a number of reasons not immediately relevant."
The motivation and content of both external trade and migration
policies is derived from, and is dependent upon, received doctrine in other
disciplines, notably economics, political science, public choice and other areas.
A. The Trading Regime
Trade law, both at the multilateral level and as domestically
implemented, in the post-Keynesian, post-World War II period of "reglobalization" has been reformed in virtually every developed country, and to
an increasing extent in other countries as well, by the twin principles of
superiority of free trade coupled with "fair" trade. Free trade economists won

8 Authors such as Posner have questioned the autonomous existence of law as a separate discipline
in general. See generally Richard Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline 19621987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 767 (1987); RICHARD POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY, Harvard
U. Press (2004).
9 In some cases, particularly in colonial times, nations existed, but were not permitted by the
colonial rulers to establish their own trade or migration policies, for example, the case of India
under the British Raj. See generally David Clingingsmith and Jeffrey Williamson, India's DeIndustrialization Under British Rule: New Ideas, New Evidence (NBER Working Paper No. 10586,
June 2004).
'0 This figure appears to have been commonly accepted being as accurate for the U.S. for late 2005.
See Jeffrey Passel, The Size and Characteristicsof the UnauthorizedMigrantPopulation in the U.S.
(Pew Hispanic Center 2006), at http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportlD=6 1; Michael
Hoefer et al., Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant PopulationResiding in the United States:
January2005 (Department of Homeland Security Report, Office of Immigration Statistics Policy
Directorate, August 2006), http://www.dhs.govlxlibrary/assets/statistics/publicationsILLPE
2005.pdf. Figures such as these are subject to rapid obsolescence as some one million additional
irregular migrants are estimated to enter the U.S. each year, net of those apprehended at the border.
" Readers may consult the work of populists such as Patrick Buchanan. See, e.g., PATRICK
BUCHANAN, STATE OF EMERGENCY: THE THIRD WORLD INVASION AND THE CONQUEST OF

AMERICA (Tomas Dunne Books 2006). More academic work along these lines includes work by the
well-known Harvard sociologist, Samuel P. Huntington. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE?
THE CHALLENGES OF AMERICA'S NATIONAL IDENTITY (Simon & Schuster 2005).
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the day during establishment of a new world trading order and monetary
system, following cessation of hostilities after the Second World War. 12 This
was not always the case; in earlier times, economic and social policy was
guided by the mistaken notion of "mercantilism" (roughly meaning that exports
are "good" and imports are "bad"). 13 Of course, the fallacy of composition
exerts its inexorable influence here as well, for one country's exports are
another's imports. In fact, the calamitous Depression of the 1930s in the U.S.
and other industrialized nations was preceded by sharp tariff increases by the
U.S. followed by retaliatory tariff measures by other countries, coupled with an
equally misguided monetary contraction in the U.S.14
Even in more recent times, during the long Cold War and mistrust of
American-style capitalism, several developing countries attempted to
purposefully close their markets to external influences, pursuing "import
substitution" rather than "export promotion". 5 The success of the exportoriented economies such as South Korea, Singapore and the other "Asian
Tigers" in achieving rapid economic growth coalesced with the ReaganThatcher free market liberal revolution of the 1980s. Even India, long known
for its regressive tariffs, began a period of rapid re-opening to international
12

The decision to establish the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank was taken at the

Bretton Woods Conference held in New Hampshire in December 1944,
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1944/440722a.html. By that time, the imminent defeat of
Germany was apparent to world leaders. The Soviet Union did not enter the International Monetary
Fund until 1991 (as Russia). See Daniel P. Erikson, Bridging the Gap: IMF and Word Bank
Membership for Socialist Countries (Inter-American Dialogue, ASCE 2003),
http://www.thedialogue.org/publications/programs/haiti/bridging-erikson.pdf. The proposed
International Trade Organization never came into being primarily owing to U.S. resistance
surrendering American hegemony to a world body. However, a negotiating forum for trade issues,
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was established in 1947. GATT was
succeeded by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. See
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif-e/fact2-e.htm. There has never existed
comparable world migration organization or even a negotiating forum, despite the fact that most
developed countries face common problems of unwanted unskilled migration coupled with a
growing scarcity of needed "knowledge workers".
13 See Laura LeHaye, Mercantilsm, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, (The Library
of Economics and Liberty 2002), at http://www.econlib.org/library/enc/Mercantilism.htnil.
14 See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY
OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960 (Princeton Univ. Press 1963).

'5In some respects, political independence was confused with economic isolation or autarky. See
Diet Rothermund, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF INDIA FROM PRE-COLONIAL TIME TO 1991 30-60
(Routledge 1993). Thus emerged the "dependencia" models of Latin American economists such as
Radl Prebisch, which were grounded upon abhorrence of foreign investment and imports. See ALAN
TAYLOR, LATIN AMERICA AND FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: ECONOMICS,

POLmCS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (NBER Working Paper No. 7394, Oct. 1999) (discussing
some of the pertinent theories, especially the "Dependencia" model)
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trade and foreign investment.
The globally accepted preference for free trade has been articulated in
legal terms by international treaties and conventions, notably the GATT/WTO
accords, and by regional arrangements such as the Treaty of Rome (later the
European Union treaty) and NAFTA.17 In fact, the proliferation of regional
trading pacts may, in the view of some authors, seriously undermine the future
relevance of multilateral accords such as the GATT/WTO. 18 The legislative
preference for free trade, through progressive lowering of tariffs, is discreetly
contained in Article XXIX of the WTO Agreement, authorizing periodic tariff
reductions (or concessions) and implemented through successive multilateral

16See A Survey of the World Economy: The New Titans, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 16, 2006, available
at 2006 WLNR 15982733.
"7See 19 U.S.C. § 3311 (Approval and entry into force of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (hereinafter "NAFTA"); see also
http://www.wto.org/english/docs.e/legal e/legal e/htm (World Trade Organization website
providing digital versions of The Uruguay Round Agreements, Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April
1994, Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, GATT 1947, and other international
agreements pertaining to transnational trade). North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153
[hereinafter GAIT 1994], the original GATT Agreement and U.S. legislation implementing the
accord be found at General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
(hereafter GATT), http://www.wto.org/english/docs-ellegal-e/gatt4701e.htm. GATT 1994
simply absorbs the 1947 GATT Agreement with the amendments agreed to until that time. GATT
1994 was then merged into the WTO accord of 1995. For ease of exposition, I shall refer as needed,
to the article numbers in GATr 1994. The European Union Treaty (hereinafter "EU Treaty") was
formally adopted in 1992 and amended the original instruments such as the Treaty of Rome;
Maastricht Treaty on the European Union, Sept. 21, 1994, 31 I.L.M. 247. See Goebel, supra note 5
(The European Community (or "EC"), originally designated as the European Economic Community,
was created by the Treaty of Rome, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (signed March 25, 1957; effective January 1,
1958). The current consolidated text of the EC Treaty as amended appears in O.J. C 325/33 (Dec.
12, 2002)). See also A CITATION MANUAL FOR EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MATERIALS ( 6 1,ed.), 23
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 935 (2000).
18 See generally, JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK (Princeton

University Press 1991); JAGDISH BHAGWATI, FREE TRADE TODAY (Princeton University Press
2001). Bilateral and plurilateral accords to which the U.S. is a party are listed at the website of the
United States Trade Representative (USTR), at
www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Section_Index.html. Space considerations preclude
extended discussion, however, for the trading partners themselves, the benefit of bilateral/regional
accord is that each country is able to extract an immediate quid pro quo from its partners, in
exchange for trade concessions, which is necessarily prohibited under the Unconditional Most
Favored Nation (MFN) Clause of the GATT/WTO accords. See also GAIT 1994, supra note 17, at
art 1.1. Formation of regional trade accords is expressly authorized under GATT/WTO. See GAIT
1994, supra note 17, at Art. XXIX.
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Rounds such as the completed Uruguay Round and the ongoing Doha Round.19
Meanwhile, regional accords such as NAFTA and the EU Treaty contain their
own detailed tariff reduction and implementation schedules.
"Fair" trade rules are intended to preserve the confidence of trade
system participants in the superiority of free trade, unencumbered and
undistorted by market imperfections or "carve outs" that may be engineered by
one or more trading partners. 20 Without such confidence in the "fairness" of the
system, the voluntary nature of multilateral or bilateral trading regimes would
quickly evaporate. Thus, both GATT/WTO agreements and the NAFTA and
EU accords contain rules meant to permit derogation from free trade under
certain circumstances. Such rules are generally described as "safeguard
measures" and encompass Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty measures,
functioning to counter predatory pricing in export markets, various Emergency
or Escape Clause measures used even in the absence of predation, but intended
21
instead to limit the disruption caused by an unforeseen surge in imports.
Likewise, exports are regulated in the trade accords through the familiar
proscription on export
subsidies which would distort free market forces and
22
hence be "unfair."
As observed earlier, international trade law has no autonomous coindependent theoretical basis of its own, and the content of trading rules is
necessarily by other disciplines.23 I shall turn to some of these disciplines in

'9 The current Doha Round began in late 2001. The Uruguay Round extended over 1986-94. See

Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott, The Doha Round after Hong Kong, POLICY BRIEF PB06-2
(Institute for International Economics, Washinghton D.C.) at
http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb06-2.pdf. A simple timeline of the various GATTIWTO
Rounds of negotiation is at the WTO website at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist_e/min98_e/slidee/slide-list.htm.
20Some very recent work suggests that many of today's advanced countries may have substituted
non-tariff barriers to replace tariff reductions. See Daniel Y. Kono, Optimal Obfuscation:
Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency,100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 369 (2006).
21 The GAT/WTA O rules are contained in the Emergency Action and Anti-dumping and
Countervailing Duties articles. GATT 1994, supra note 17, at arts. VI, XIX. For additional
discussion and U.S. legislation implementing specific sections of the GATT accords, see generally
Daniel K. Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of InternationalTrade, 100 HARV. L. REV.
546 (1987).
22Export subsidy proscriptions are contained in Article XVI of the GATT/WTO accords. GATT
1994, supra note 17, at art XVI. Legislation in the U.S. (and in other countries) also contains a
plethora of usually opaque export classifications and regulations which may be scattered in different
sections of the United States Code. See, e.g., Export Administration Act, 50 App. U.S.C. § 2403
(1979) (containing some of U.S. export control regulations pertaining to export license
classifications). Other controls and regulations are scattered elsewhere. See, e.g., Peter
Lichtenbaum, Coping with U.S. Export Controls, 872 PL1/COMM 345 (2004).
23Foreign affairs practice or international relations with other countries affect trade policy to a
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what follows.
B. Migration Rules and Regimes
In sharp contrast to the world trading order, there is no international
migration regime or world migration body, other than a few conventions
dealing with certain specific areas such as stateless persons, refugee status,
human trafficking and a few others. 24 Instead, immigration and nationality
policies are creatures of domestic legislation, the exception being isolated labor
mobility accords, such as those between certain Scandinavian countries,
Australia and New Zealand, and the still incompletely-implemented Schengen
Agreements (pertaining to a common border policy) in the European Union.
Denmark and the United Kingdom for example, have still not acceded to the
common border rules of the Schengen Agreement and the new periphery
members of the Union (such as Bulgaria and Romania) are not expected to have
access to labor markets of the inner core countries until at least 2012, much less
to the common border accords of the Schengen Agreements. Domestic rules in
each country, often a product of historical, geographical and cultural factors,
determine the permissible types and amounts of permanent and temporary
migration (relating to quotas and ceilings), nationality and citizenship rules
(pertaining to acquisition or forfeiture of unitary or dual citizenship), refugee
and asylum policies (rules dealing with classification or refoulement, etc), along

significant degree. For example, trade sanctions are predicated upon foreign policy considerations,
not on economic grounds. For example, the decaded long trade embargo of Cuba by the U.S. is
grounded in U.S. displeasure with the Castro regime. Trade sanctions against Iran are discussed in
Jeffrey Schott, Economic Sanctions, Oil, and Iran (Testimony before Congress on July 25, 2006) at
http://www.iie.comlpublications/papers/paper.cfin?ResearchlD=649.
24 See, e.g. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, adopted on Sept. 9, 1954, 360
U.N.T.S. 117 (entered into force June 6, 1960), http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o-c-sp.htm;
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted on July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150
(entered into force Apr. 22, 1954), http://www.unhchr.ch/htmlmenu3Ib/oc_ref.htm; Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children,
supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted on
Nov. 30, 2000, G.A. Res. 25, annex l1, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 60, U.N. Doc.
A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001) (enteredinto force Dec. 25, 2003),
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/protocoltraffc.htm.
2 See, e.g., The Trans-Tasman Travel Agreement, at http://www.mfat.govt.nz/ForeignRelations/Australia/0-trans-tasman-travel.php; see also Belgium-France-Federal Republic of
Germany-Luxemburg-Netherlands: Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at
Their Common Borders and the Convention Applying the Agreement, Agreement done at
Schengen, June 14, 1985; Convention done at Schengen, June 19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 68 (1991) and
Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, 141,
http://www.europarl.europa.eultopics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf (modifying the Schengen Agreement
and integrating it into the framework of the Treaty on European Union).
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with other attributes of migration.26
Unlike trading rules, migration rules are not squarely grounded in
global economic considerations; if they were, and as demonstrated by a number
of studies including a recent comprehensive report by the World Bank, free
international mobility of persons would have been more prevalent and reflected
in the official policies of states. 27 Instead, migration and citizenship rules are
firmly rooted in considerations of history, demography (population pressures),
political science (considerations of state sovereignty over defined areas
including empire-building) and sociology (assimilative and cultural concerns).28
There is also little doubt that parochial and sector-specific protectionist
concerns have also played a large part in the "capture" of enacted immigration

26See, e.g., The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 §§ 201-204, 208, 310-320, 322, 324-344,
346-347, 349, 351,356-357, 8 U.S.C §§ 1151-1154, 1158, 1421-1431, 1433, 1435-1455, 14571458, 1481, 1483, 1488-1489 (2000) (quotas are dealt with in I.N.A. §§ 201-204, nationality in §§
310-357, while asylum and refugee status are covered in § 208).
27 See THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2006: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF

REMIrANCES AND MIGRATION (World Bank Publications 2005), http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/servletlWDSContentServer/WDSPIB/2005/11/14/000112742_2005111417492
8/Rendered/PDF /343200GEP02006.pdf (listing the potential gains from international migration
(based upon a large scale simulation model) and suggesting a conclusion, from the simulation
results (which might well be underestimated), indicating that the potential worldwide gains from
unimpeded migration are quite large, with larger benefits accruing to lowincome countries.). See
also Bob Hamilton and John Whalley, Efficiency and DistributionalImplications of Global
Restrictions on Labor Mobility, 14 J. DEV. ECON. 61 (1984) (suggesting similar results from more
free international labor mobility); Jonathon W. Moses and Bj6rn Letnes, The Economic Costs To
InternationalLabor Restrictions: Revisiting The EmpiricalDiscussion,32 WORLD DEV. 1609
(2004); and Howard F. Chang, The Economic Impact of InternationalLabor Migration:Recent
Estimates and Policy Implications, 16 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
28See Graziella Bertocchi & Chiara Strazzi, CITIZENSHIP LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 71.2005, 2005),
availableat http://ideas.repec.org/p/fem/femwpa/2005.71.html (follow "download info" hyperlink;
then follow "download the selected file" hyperlink) (providing an excellent theoretical and empirical
examination of the origin and evolution of citizenship rules in various nations). See also T.
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF AND DOUGLAS KLUSMEYER, CITIZENSHIP POLICIES FOR AN AGE OF
MIGRATION (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2002) (providing more legal perspectives
on national citizenship). Assimilative and cultural concerns over continued immigration, even into
the U.S., is hardly a new phenomenon. The literacy test requirement enacted in 1917 over President
Wilson's veto was intended to curb migration from Southern and Eastern Europe. The "inferiority"
of the Mediterranean races was in fact, assumed by the Dillingham Commission of 1910 that issued
a 42-volume report. The Dillingham Commission report and other scholars warned repeatedly
against the acceptance of "beaten members of beaten breeds." See MALDWYN A. JONES, AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION (2"d ed. 1992); JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
NATIVISM, 1860-1925, (2'ded. 1998) (explaining that social and scientific Darwinism was already in
full flower in the United States at that time).
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policies, both with respect to lawful and irregular migration.29 Concerns over
possible loss of jobs or wage erosion or imposition of fiscal burdens due to
social transfers to arriving migrants have always loomed large in the costbenefit ratio of migration for certain regions or sectors, at least in enfranchised
liberal democracies. 30 This theme is discussed in greater detail in a later Section
where it is observed that more autocratic regimes are likely to be more liberal
with respect to immigration, precisely because such regimes are less responsive
to the preferences of average citizens or median voters.

III. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
While international trade and migration are separate sub-fields among
scholars in economics (international economics and labor economics
respectively), theoretical constructs developed by trade theorists several decades
ago are fully capable of generating testable hypotheses about the effects of trade
liberalization upon incentives to migrate and conversely. Typical work in trade
analysis has not however, proceeded along these lines, focusing instead on the
predicted patterns of trade (i.e. which countries export which goods) and on the
effects of free trade upon prices of goods, returns to inputs or factors of
production such as labor, capital and land and on the aggregate distribution of
income and welfare. 31 However, the interrelationship between trade and
29 For instance, the end of the Bracero program in the U.S. (which permitted Mexican farm labor to
lawfully work on a temporary rotating basis in the U.S.) in 1964 may be largely attributable to
political pressure exerted by powerful farm labor interests in the U.S.. See GARY C. HUFBAUER &
JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NAFTA REVISITED: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES (Institute for

International Economics 2005). More than a century ago, the Chinese Exclusion Acts of the 1880s
were a direct result of numerous complaints by U.S. business interests especially in the West over
these foreign workers who "worked too hard". In more recent times, the ceiling on H-IB "specialty
occupation" visas was temporarily raised in response to the expressed need of U.S. business for
high-tech workers. See H-IB visa a Bit Playerin Immigration Debate, May 26, 2006, at
http://www.itbusinessedge.com/item/?ci=16808. A myriad of pending immigration bills too
numerous to review here (and including Senate Bill S 2611 originally passed in May 2006) would
also allocate a much larger number of temporary worker visas for certain skilled workers.

30 The fiscal burdens associated with inbound migration are unevenly distributed across the various
states in the U.S. and the tax burdens involved in such costs are directly reflected in voters' attitudes
toward migration. For example, voters in states with relatively generous welfare systems and high
state taxes are markedly more restrictionist in their views regarding further migration than voters in
states where a meager welfare net does not impose a substantial cost of upon natives when new
migrants arrive. See GORDON H. HANSON, WHY DOES IMMIGRATION DIVIDE AMERICA? PUBLIC
FINANCE AND OPPOSITION To OPEN BORDERS (Institute for International Economics 2005).

3' The genesis of the modem Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade may be dated to a paper originally
published in Swedish by Eli Heckscher in 1919 and translated into English some thirty years later.
Heckscher's student, Bertil Ohlin (recipient of the 1977 Nobel Prize in economics) explicated the
framework further. Refinements by Samuelson and Stolper in 1941, T.M. Rybczynski in 1955 and
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migration can readily be deduced from elementary models of trade, notably the
Heckscher-Ohlin framework, which has been the standard workhorse of trade
analysts for a number of decades. 32 On the other hand, it is the work of labor
economists that deals primarily with causes and effects of migration, both
internally within a country and internationally, but most of this literature has no
direct implications for patterns or consequences of international trade in goods
and services.
A. Trade Frameworks
This sub-section demonstrates that the standard workhorse trade model
generates a strong testable conclusion regarding trade and international
migration, namely that trade in goods is a strong substitute for migration of
persons. A nation may elect either route; either import goods and services or
import the people whose labor is embodied in the goods (i.e. allow migration).
Either policy will have the same equalizing effect upon wages and returns to
capital in the importing and exporting countries. Thus, free trade alone will
dampen the incentives to migrate internationally. 33 If true, these results are
particularly attractive to policy makers. For example, the implication is that a
free trade agreement such as the NAFTA would allow both the United States
and Mexico to reap the well-known benefits of geographical specialization and
at the same time, reduce, if not eliminate further migration from Mexico to the
United States. There would be no need for additional immigration-restricting
measures such as construction of a border fence or enhanced interior
enforcement.
Reality however, is much more complex and the strong substitute
relationship between trade and migration has not manifested itself, either in
reality or in the policy stance actually adopted by governments over the last two
hundred years.34 While the vintage trade framework can be refined or extended

Ronald Jones in 1965 among others followed. See T.M. Rybczynski, FactorEndowments and
Relative Prices, 22 ECONOMICA 336 (1955); Wolfgang F. Stopler & Paul A. Samuelson, Protection
and Real Wages, 9 REv. ECON. STUD. 58 (1941); and Ronald W. Jones, The Structure of Simple
GeneralEquilibrium Models, 73 J. POL. ECON. 557 (1965). The interested reader may refer to any
standard text in international economics for further details, for example, PAUL R. KRUGMAN AND
MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY (6th ed. 2002).

32Rybczynski, supra note 31; Stopler & Samuelson, supra note 31; Jones, supra note 31.
33 A corollary implication of this stark framework is that persons in both countries are fully
symmetric in their preferences toward trade and migration. Depending upon their relative skill level,
they are either both pro-trade and pro-migration or opposed to both. See discussion infra Part IH.B.
34 A hundred years ago, as noted above, most developed countries, especially those in the New
World, followed relatively restrictive trade policies coupled with a liberal migration policy stance.
Starting in the early twentieth century, the policy mix has reversed itself with the trading regime
being liberal, while migration controls continue to be tightened. See TIMOTHY J. HATTON &
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to produce much more complex relationships between trade and migration,
unfortunately, much of this more modem literature appears to have escaped
writers in fields other than economics, particularly, international trade. Many
authors writing in law-related journals and indeed many public officials have
continued to assume that trade and migration are tied together as substitute,
alternative policies.35
The Vintage Framework
The demonstration of the stark implication of the vintage trade model
regarding the patterns of trade and the trade-migration link is straightforward. 36
The standard Heckscher-Ohlin framework finds its most comfortable home in a
highly stylized world in which there are only two countries, rich and poor (or
North and South), only two inputs in the production process in each country,
each of which is capable of producing two goods, but at different relative costs
and prices.37 For reasons of history, geography or natural accident, countries
are assumed to be differentially endowed with these inputs and all differences in
cost-price structures of the two goods are directly attributable to the relative
endowments of the two inputs/factors in the two countries. Perfect competition
and constant returns to scale exist in all markets.38 These assumptions may
appear highly restrictive; however, many can be relaxed without loss of
generality in the results. Although, it is typical to assume that the two inputs in
the productive process are labor and capital, instead the paradigm of unskilled
and skilled labor will be utlized. If desired, the reader may assume that capital is
simply "congealed" or embedded skilled labor (such as "knowledge workers").
The rich country is rich precisely because it is better endowed with skilled labor
relative to unskilled labor, compared with the poor country. Because of the
existence of competitive markets, wages of skilled labor relative to unskilled
labor will be lower in the rich country compared with the poor country in the
absence of trade. This is a natural consequence of the relative abundance of
skilled labor in the rich country. Accordingly, the rich country has a
comparative advantage in producing goods that intensively utilize skilled labor
in the production process. If free trade, or some trade, is now allowed, the rich

JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON, A DUAL POLICY PARADOX: WHY HAVE TRADE AND MIGRATION
POLICIES ALWAYS DIFFERED IN LABOR-SCARCE ECONOMIES? (NBER Discussion Paper No. 2145,

2006).
35 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 5.
36There are several alternative methods to present the framework. The one utlized is particularly
simplified for expositional purposes. Standard textbooks usually rely upon more formalistic
structures. See, e.g., KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 31.
37 See KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 31.
38 Id.
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country will export goods that are intensive in the use of skilled labor in the
production process since it can produce such goods at a lower price than its
trading partner.
What occurs as trade continues? As the rich country expands
production of goods intensive in the use of skilled labor, given a finite supply of
skilled labor and capacity and capital constraints, skilled labor gradually
becomes more expensive in the rich country, with the opposite phenomenon
occurring in the poor country, which would be expected to export goods
intensive in the use of unskilled labor. 39 On both counts, differentials between
relative wages of skilled to unskilled labor in the rich country narrow with free
trade. This implication of course, is the quintessential reason why unskilled
labor in rich countries would generally tend to oppose free trade. An alternative
way of phrasing this is that protection, the opposite of free trade, benefits the
scarce factor, which is unskilled labor in the rich country. 40 It should come as
no surprise therefore, that groups such as the AFL-CIO, which generally
represent unskilled or moderately skilled workers, have remained strident in
their opposition to trade pacts such as NAFTA or CAFTA-DR.4'
Although not normally presented as such, the standard workhorse
model also implies symmetric conclusions regarding migration of persons,
instead of trade in goods and services. If the migration policies of rich countries
were to permit unimpeded and inexpensive migration of persons across
countries, the relative wages of unskilled labor in the rich country, when
compared with the poor country, would prove to be a magnet and such labor
would migrate en masse from the poor to the rich country. The result would be
identical to that observed for free trade in goods. Relative wages of skilled to
unskilled labor in the two countries would tend to converge. Hence, a symtrie
ilegantj emerges in this elementary framework. International trade and
migration are indeed complete substitutes, with regard to their effects upon
relative wages in the two countries. Free trade alone erodes the incentives to
migrate and free labor mobility alone would eliminate the basis for mutually
profitable trade.42

39 These are standard propositions in elementary trade theory. See KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra
note 3 1.
40This result - protection benefits the scarce factor - is termed the Samuelson-Stopler theorem. See
Stopler & Samuelson, supra note 3 1.
41 See, e.g,, Labor Movement Declaration Concerning the United States-CentralAmerica Free
Trade Agreement, San Jose, Costa Rica, Nov. 18, 2002, at

http://www.aflcio.org/issues/jobseconomy/globaleconomy/battle/cafta-declaration.cfm.
42 It is also easily observed that the loser from migration would be unskilled labor in the rich
country which was initially scarce. Hence, unskilled labor in the rich country would be expected to
oppose both free trade and liberal migration policies (with the opposite implications for skilled labor
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The fact that liberalized trade and migration are strong substitutes in
their ultimate effects upon wages of skilled and unskilled labor has immediate,
practical implications for policymakers. Free trade will certainly diminish the
incentives for cross-country migration, but at the cost of eroding the relative
wage advantage of skilled labor in rich countries. Immigration restrictions in the
presence of free trade are not likely to protect domestic wages in the rich
country, other than temporarily. This policy mix - free trade and closed or semiclosed borders is the policy stance currently adopted in all advanced countries. 4
If the assumptions of the vintage framework are accurate, there is only one way
to fully protect domestic labor in rich countries and it is not economically nor
politically palatable. Both trade and migration policies would need to be
simultaneously restricted. Such is the inexorable logic of the strong substitute
relationship implied by the standard trade framework.
More Modem Trade Structures
While the standard trade framework described above has proven to be
useful in explaining observed reality, its stark assumptions of full information
and perfect competition in all markets (in addition to the existence of only two
inputs) have led theorists to pursue several more realistic extensions. While a
detailed exposition of such extensions is not of immediate relevance to the
present paper, it is important to observe that in most cases, more complex and
realistic structures undermine, and can reverse, the strict substitutability trademigration link noted above. It is quite possible therefore, for trade flows to be
complementary to migration flows, i.e. increased trade in goods and services
may, in fact, generate incentives for additional migration flows. In such cases,
policy makers desiring liberalized trade but reduced migration (as is the case in
most advanced nations) would necessarily have to deploy a judicious
combination of trade and migration policies. One policy by itself will not do,
even in theory.
One common extension of the standard framework involves the
recognition of "specific factors," i.e. the fact that certain inputs are specific to
certain sectors or industries and are not easily transferable across sectors. This
may be because of the existence of specialized capital equipment or specifically

in the rich country). Whether or not the preferences of workers are reflected in actual government
policies is dependent upon the degree of voter enfranchisement and engagement in the political
process.
43 Immigration Trends and policies in advanced countries are documented in various reports of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, Paris). See generally,
(OECD, Paris 2006) and OECD FACTBOOK 2007
(OECD, Paris 2007).
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acquired skills. 44 Specificity of inputs may be limited to certain inputs, for
example, fixed capital or unskilled/moderately-skilled labor, while highly
skilled labor may be highly mobile, even across national boundaries. This
would be the case for example, of "knowledge workers" who have migrated in
increasingly large numbers from poorer to richer countries.45
In frameworks such as those involving specific factors or where there
are substantial departures from perfect competition, such as increasing returns
to scale and/or monopolistic competition, a rich series of results may emerge.46
Most of these are beyond the scope of the present article; however, it is quite
possible for trade liberalization to lead to widened wage disparities and hence,
to increased migration, legal or otherwise. Similarly, non-competitive structures
such as increasing returns to scale could lead to accentuation of differences
between countries and the emergence of "core-periphery" structures. Trade
liberalization in this context will almost certainly lead to increased migration of
skilled labor to the "core" country.47
It is noteworthy that "core-periphery" or agglomeration frameworks
generate or are consistent with "network effects" in an economic sense.
Network effects, albeit of the socio-cultural type, are often48crucial to
sociological and anthropological explanations of migration patterns.

44 One would not expect heavy machinery used in say, coal mining to be easily adaptable to the
manufacture of memory chips, nor that coal miners could readily be usefully employed in software
design. The seminal work in this area is Ronald Jones, A Three-FactorModel in Theory, Trade and
History, in TRADE, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND GROWTH, (Jagdish Bhagwati ed., 1971). See also
Anthony Venables & Victor Norman, InternationalTrade, FactorMobility and Trade Costs, 101
ECON. J. 1488 (1995). The existence of "adjustment costs" is the basis for trade adjustment
programs in some countries. The current U.S. statute is the Trade Adjustment and Reform Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 stat. 933 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. 26
(2002)). Information on the numbers of petitions for relief filed and those approved is maintained by
the U.S. Department of Labor, Trade Act Petitions, http://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/trade-data.
45 The latter phenomenon is the subject of much recent attention in literature on the "brain drain."
See Simon Commander et al., The Brain Drain, Curse or Boon: A Survey of the Literature, in
CHALLENGES To GLOBALIZATION: ANALYZING THE ECONOMICS 235 (Robert Baldwin & L. Alan
Winters eds., (Univ. Chicago Press 2004)); see also PHILIP MARTIN ET AL., MANAGING LABOR
MIGRATION IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY (Yale Univ. Press 2005).
46 A few of the classic references incorporate imperfect competition or increasing returns to scale.
See e.g., PAUL KRUGMAN, GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE (MIT Press 1991); ELHANAN HELPMAN &
PAUL KRUGMAN, MARKET STRUCTURE AND FOREIGN TRADE: INCREASING RETURNS, IMPERFECT
COMPETITION AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY (MIT Press

1987);

JAMES MARKUSEN,

MULTINATIONAL FIRMS AND THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (MIT Press 2002).
47 See KRUGMAN, GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE, supra note 46; HELPMAN & KRUGMAN, supra note 46;
MARKUSEN, supra note 46.
48 See, e.g., NANCY FONER, REUBEN RUMBAUT & STEVEN GOLD, IMMIGRATION RESEARCH FOR A
NEW CENTURY: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Russell Sage Foundation, 2003); GLOBAL
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Contrary to what may be all too commonly assumed by nonspecialists, trade theory does not unequivocally pin down the direction of the
trade-migration relationship. It is immediately apparent however, that the nature
and direction of the link could not be more relevant to policy makers, for an
incautiously chosen combination might render impotent both trade and
migration policies. Empirical analysis alone can shed further light on the nature
of the trade-migration relationship and these are discussed in the next Section.
EmpiricalResults
As indicated above, the trade-migration policy mix adopted by most
developed countries underwent a major shift in the early twentieth century,
from one of restrictive tariffs and liberal migration to liberalized trade and
restrictive migration. Countries in the Old World generally adopted free trade
policies before the New World, and New World countries, being the early
recipients of inbound migration, imposed immigration restrictions prior to Old
World countries.49 Within the group of Old World and New World countries,
there was considerable variation in the time of adoption of liberal or illiberal
policies. 50 These facts would suggest the tailor-made possibility of empirical
analysis. Surprisingly and unfortunately though, there has been very little in the
way of empirical testing of the nature of the trade-migration relationship. An
important exception is the work of the economic historian Jeffrey Williamson
and his colleagues and in what follows, the empirical regularities observed by
these authors is examined. 51 An important caveat is that the work of
Williamson, et al., is limited primarily to historical evidence for periods
preceding the mid-twentieth century. Extension of this type of work to
encompass the rest of the twentieth century still awaits further scholarly
endeavor.
In an often-cited paper, Collins, et al., have performed both time-series
and cross-section panel data tests to attempt to determine the nature and

NETWORKS, LINKED CITIES (Saskia Saasen ed., Routledge 2001); MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF
THE NETWORK SOCIETY (2d ed. Blackwell 2000); DOUGLAS MASSEY & J. EDWARD TAYLOR,
PROSPECTS AND POLICIES IN A GLOBAL MARKET (Oxford U. Press 2004).
49 See HATrON AND WILLIAMSON, supra note 34.
50 See generally TIMOTHY HATrON & JEFFREY WILLIAMSON, THE AGE OF MASS MIGRATION:
CAUSES AND ECONOMIC IMPACT (Oxford Univ. Press 1998).
51 The key references are WILLIAM COLLINS ET AL., WERE TRADE AND FACTOR MOBILITY

SUBSTITUTES IN HISTORY? (NBER Working Paper No. 6059, 1997); JEFFREY WILLIAMSON,
WINNERS AND LOSERS OVER TWO CENTURIES OF GLOBALIZATION (NBER Working Paper No.
9161, 2002); ASHLEY TIMMER & JEFFREY WILLIAMSON, RACISM, XENOPHOBIA OR MARKETS: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IMMIGRATION POLICY PRIOR To THE THIRTIES (NBER Working Paper

No. 5867, 1996).
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direction of the trade-migration link over the period 1870-1936, with the data
set being truncated to exclude the war years of 1914-1918.2 Countries included
in the empirical tests include New World labor receiving countries such as the
U.S., Canada and Australia and the dominant industrialized countries of the
time, of which the United Kingdom was the unquestioned leader.53 Regressions
of real absolute trade flows (i.e. exports plus imports) on a number of
explanatory variables including gross migration, net capital flows, tariff revenue
and a proxy for transportation costs fail to indicate that trade and migration
flows are negatively related, which would be necessary if trade flows were truly
a substitute for international migration.54 If at all, the available evidence seems
to support the hypothesis of a mild complementary relationship between trade
and migration over the indicated period. In other words, increased trade flows
were accompanied by increased migration to the New World.55
Cross-section pooled regressions carried out for each decade separately
over approximately the same period also fail to yield a negative association
between trade flows (deflated by GDP) and net migration flows. There may be
lurking statistical and econometric problems in the econometric procedure, such
as correlation between some of the independent variables, for example, labor
and capital flows. Nevertheless, the results are of interest in that even in a weak
associational sense, there appears to be no support for the substitutability
hypothesis between trade and migration flows. It may well be that omitted
factors such as non-economic variables that may affect migration in particular
(for instance, xenophobic or assimilative concerns) may need to be included in
the empirical procedure to more fully explain the complex link between trade
and migration. Work of this type remains unexplored territory at present.
Another possible perspective on the nature of a trade-migration link
may be to inquire whether policy-makers acted as though they believed that
trade and migration were substitutable. Timmer and Williamson have
painstakingly examined the immigration policies of a number of New World
countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada and the United States) over long
historical periods prior to the 1930s and have meticulously constructed
56
measures of restrictiveness of such policies over the relevant periods.
Unfortunately, no such important work appears to have been performed in the
post-WWII era. The immigration restrictiveness index is then regressed over
various explanatory variables, including trade to GDP ratios, a host of

52 See COLLINS ET AL., supra note

5 1.

53 Id.
54 id.
55 Id.
56 See TIMMER & WILLIAMSON, supra note 51.
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macroeconomic variables, variables intended to capture the relative skills of
immigrants versus natives, as well as some political variables, such as the
degree of political participation.57 The variable for relative skills of immigrants
as compared
to natives is intended to capture immigrant selectivity based upon
"quality." 58 For the most part, migration to the New World during this period
was of unskilled labor which would be expected to increase income inequality
in the New World in the same manner as would imports of goods that were
produced primarily by unskilled labor.
While the interested reader is referred to the works cited above for
more details, the significant point for present purposes is that the ratio of trade
to GDP is statistically insignificant in explaining the progressive change in New
World immigration policies over long periods. Policy makers did not act as
though they regarded trade and migration policies as being interchangeable. If
they had done so, then the relative position of domestic labor could well have
been protected by restrictive immigration policy alone or by only restricting
imports of unskilled labor intensive goods, but not both.
B. Labor Market Frameworks
Unlike the trade frameworks or analytical constructs discussed above,
labor market scholars have focused primarily on the migration of persons and
typically contain no direct implications for international trade policy. If trade
policy cannot "explain" the migration stance because it appears to be unrelated
to migration as discussed above, perhaps immigrant selectivity based upon labor
market considerations, in addition to a host of other non-economic sociopolitical factors, might offer a more satisfactory explanation of migration
policies as they evolved over long periods.
Early analysis of migration of persons dates to the pioneering work of
Harris and Todaro in the context of internal migration (rural to urban). 59 In this
57 Id. at Appendices. (The scores for the immigration policy index, which range from -5 to +5, for

the U.S. are presented in Appendix B of the Timmer & Williamson Working Paper. For example,
the index was set at a neutral 0 in 1868 when indenture contracts were repealed in the U.S. By 1907,
the increase in head taxes on arriving immigrants and the establishment of financial tests for
admission to the U.S. lowered the score to -2. The literacy test established in 1917 reduced it to -3.5,
and finally to -5 with the establishment of permanent immigration quotas).
58 See TIMMER & WILLIAMSON, supra note 51.
59 John Harris & Michael Todaro, Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector
Analysis, 60 AMER. ECON. REv. 126 (1970). The rural-urban migration framework is intimately
related to analytical constructs emphasizing "dual" or segmented labor markets, for instance an
informal sector in which employment is casual and wages are low and a formal, urban sector. In an
international context, temporary worker ("Gastarbeiter") programs are based in part on the
recognition that certain jobs can only be filled by immigrants and programs of this type often
merely place the state's imprimatur on what already exists. See MARTIN ET AL., supra note 45; See
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framework, rural-urban migration is determined by the present discounted value
of the rural-urban wage differential, net of anticipated migration and resettlement costs. 60 Straightforward extension of this framework to international
migration implies that the expected supply of migrants is determined by the
domestic-foreign wage differential (appropriately cumulated and discounted),
net of migration and assimilation costs, taking into account the new possibility
of deportation from the host country. 61 In a framework of this type, the
continued migration form Mexico to the U.S. or from Albania to Italy is likely
to continue unabated for 62now, given the large wage differentials and labor pools
in the relevant countries.
The "self-selection" hypothesis of Borjas is another proposed source of
immigration based upon relative market skills of immigrants and natives that
has gained considerable support in the literature.63 In fact, the relative skills of
64
migrants have long been the focus of attention in the U.S. and most countries.
The literacy test enacted in 1917 by the U.S. was intended primarily to curb
immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, whose emigrants were thought
to be of lower "quality" than of previous immigrants from Western and
Northern Europe. 65 While some 80 percent of the annual quota for immigrants
into the U.S. is based upon family ties, the 20 percent or less reserved for
employment-based immigration is allocated to categories known as
"preferences".66 Unskilled labor is allocated in smaller quotas than skilled labor

also RICHARD FLORIDA, CITIES AND THE CREATIVE CLASS (Routledge 2004).
60 Harris & Todaro, supra note 59.

61 For a short, but excellent paper along these lines, see Douglas S. Massey & Felipe Garcia
Espana, The Social Processof InternationalMigration,237 SCIENCE 733 (1987).
62Projections of the labor pool available from Mexico, in view of the expected rise in Mexican
incomes and decline in Mexican fertility rates seem to suggest however, that within a decade and a
half at most, the "pull" of much higher U.S. wage rates and the "push" factor of lack of suitable
employment in Mexico should both curb unlawful migration to the U.S., with or without border
fences. See, e.g., HUFBAUER & SCHOTr, supra note 29. For an excellent review of U.S.-Mexico
integration, SEE PHILIP MARTIN, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND MIGRATION: THE MEXICO-U. S.
CASE (Wider Discussion Paper No. 2003/35), at
http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/dps/dps2003/dp2003-35.pdf. For Mexican population and
migration forecasts, see DAVID A. BRAUER, PROJECTIONS OF NET MIGRATION TO THE UNITED
STATES, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE PUB. No. 2774 (2006),

http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/72xx/doc7249/06-06-Immigration.pdf.
63George J. Borjas, Self Selection and the Earningsof Immigrants, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 531 (1987).
64 For a detailed discussion of various aspects of Mexican migration to the U.S., See GEORGE J.
BORJAS, MEXICAN IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES (University of Chicago Press forthcoming

2007), http://www.nber.org/books/mexico/index.html.
65 See JONES, supra note 28 at 222.
66 Immigration and Naturalization Act § 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).
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and has much longer processing times.67 In similar fashion, temporary visas
allocated to unskilled labor are smaller and subject to much longer delays than
those for skilled labor.68
The "self-selection" hypothesis has clear implications for voter
attitudes toward immigration in host countries and as discussed below, recent
work on such attitudes appears to be consistent with the hypothesis.6 9 The
hypothesis predicts that international migration is closely related to two factors,
the relative skills of migrants versus natives and the extant degrees of inequality
in income distributions in the sending and receiving countries. Thus, there will
be negative self-selection of migrants, meaning that low skilled workers would
prefer to emigrate, into destination countries with more egalitarian income
distributions than to those countries with highly skewed income distributions.
Since migrants moving into countries with a more unequal income distribution
tend to be higher skilled (i.e. positively selected) than those migrating to
egalitarian host societies, it follows that skilled natives, who face competitive
pressures from the inflow of skilled migrants, would tend to be more antiimmigrant than those in more equal societies.
Skill levels are highly correlated with educational attainment so that
better educated natives in more unequal societies, such as the U.S., would be
expected to oppose migration more so than well-educated natives in more
egalitarian societies, such as those in Northern Europe.7 ° Whether or not these
predictions are currently borne out is an empirical matter addressed below in the
Section on public choice.

67 id.

68 See Department of State, Visa Bulletin Vol. VIII, No. 102 (Feb. 2007),
http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_311 l.html. Visa categories are defined in Section
203 of the I.N.A., supra note 66. Time delays in processing various applications are not the I.N.A.,
but the Department of State Visa Bulletin provides an approximation of current delays.
69For further discussion, see infra Section V. The literature on the changing patterns of skills of
immigrants is simply too vast to be reviewed here. See, e.g., George J. Borjas, The Economics
iflmmigration, 32 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1667 (1994). Some earlier literature had suggested that
informational failures might lead to a disproportionately large number of unskilled workers entering
host countries, since their potential employers may not be able to accurately gauge their true lack of
skills. See, e.g., Eliakim Katz and Oded Stark, Migrationand Asymmetric Information: Comment,
74 AM. ECON. REV. 533 (1987).
70 Data in income inequality may be obtained from several sources. See generally BRANKO
MILANOVIC, WORLDS APART: MEASURING INTERNATIONAL AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY (Princeton
University Press 2005); JAMES B. DAVIES ET AL., THE WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD

WEALTH (UNU-WIDER 2006),
http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/2006-2007/2006-2007- 1/wider-wdhw-launch-5-12-2006/wider-

wdhw-report-5-12- 2006.pdf.
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C. The Continuing Paradox
In the Introduction of this paper, it was noted that today's labor-scarce
advanced economies have apparently never simultaneously maintained both
free trade and liberal migration policies, at least over the last two hundred years.
Typical accounts though, of the last two centuries often refer to the first global
century (roughly 1860-1914) as being the belle epoque or the golden age of
globalization, with trade, labor and capital all being freely internationally
mobile. 71
The second global century (approximately 1950-Present) is
commonly regarded as being global with respect to rapid expansion in trade and
cross-border capital flows, but not international labor flows.
Recent work indicates however, that the first global century was not so
global after all, being characterized for the most part by restrictive tariffs
coupled with relatively liberal international migration policies. 72 By the end of
the First World War, a major paradigm shift had occurred. Now, especially after
1950 free trade began to flourish along with international capital movements, to
some extent, although the major boost to the latter occurred after the
dismantling of remaining capital controls by advanced countries in the 1980s. 73
These observations suggest that, contrary to the classic trade model and
contrary to what has been commonly assumed by non-specialists, trade and
migration were never regarded as substitutes.
In the labor-scarce economies of the New World in Particular, an
increase in tariffs would raise domestic wages and protect domestic labor, this
being an elementary statement of the classic Samuelson-Stolper result. If trade
and migration were in fact substitutes, then permitting unimpeded labor flows at
the same time would certainly undo the protective effects of higher tariffs.

71 See MIGRATION: THE CONTROVERSIES AND THE EVIDENCE (R. Faini, Jaime de Melo and K.
Zimmerman, eds., Cambridge University Press 1999). See HATTON & WILLIAMSON, supra note 34.
72 See JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WORLD MASS MIGRATION:
COMPARING Two GLOBAL CENTURIES (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
2005); JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON, GLOBALIZATION AND THE POOR PERIPHERY BEFORE 1950 (MIT
Press 2006); NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. CONF. REP., GLOBALIZATION IN HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVE (M.D. Bordo, A.M. Taylor & J.G. Williamson, eds., U.
Chicago Press 2005). Tariff rates in most of the New World (including the U.S.) during the first
global century remained highly protective until 1914. In fact, as late as 1945, average tariffs on
industrial goods in advanced countries stood at an astounding average of 40 percent. See HATTON &
WILLIAMSON, supra note 34. The beginning of the free trade era or the belle epoque was not, as is
commonly assumed, the famous Cobden-Chevalier Treaty between Britain and France of 1860. See
Gregory Bresiger, Trade Trumps War: How Two Ancient Enemies Turned Away From Bloodshed.
More Trade or More Forts?, Mar. 6, 2000, http://www.antiwar.com/orig/bresigerl.htmnl.
73 Capital and exchange controls of each country are summarized in the Annual Report on
Exchange Arrangementsand Exchange Restrictions, International Monetary Fund (Sept. 9, 2002).
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Trade and migration were not substitutes, but instead, stood in a complementary
relationship in the first global century. Precisely the same logic applies to show
that in the second global century, characterized by free trade and migration
restrictions, trade and migration could not have been substitutes. If they had
been, free trade itself would have eroded the incentives to migrate and there
would be no need for fiscally and politically costly restrictive migration
policies. Finally, as noted previously, immigration policies in the New World
remained mildly pro-liberal or at least neutral, until the First World War. After
that, the immigration restrictiveness index, compiled by Timmer and
Williamson, demonstrates a sharp restriction of migration policy between 1917
and 1930.74 No such index is available for the years beyond 1930, but it would

be a rare scholar indeed who would question that in the second global century
(after 1950), migration7 5 policies tightened much further in all advanced countries
and continue to do so

But why did the policy mix in advanced countries undergo a complete
reversal in the early twentieth century? While several economic, quasieconomic and non-economic explanations may be offered, it is easier to
confront economic explanations with empirical evidence. Other explanations,
such as demographic, ethnic or socio-cultural reasonings no doubt played and
continue to play an important part. However, rigorous empirical verification or
falsification of such hypotheses is not usually possible because of the lack of
appropriate quantitative data.
Three principal reasons can be hypothesized for the turnaround in the
trade-migration policy combination a century ago. First is an explanation
grounded in immigrant skills or immigrant "quality. ' 76

As the poverty

constraint in Europe eased, poorer and less skilled persons were able to migrate
to the New World, with the result that unskilled or semi-skilled native workers
were increasingly threatened by the newcomers. 7 During the early period too,

See TIMMER & WILLIAMSON, supra note 5 1.
75 Lacking a formal immigration policy index after 1930, one may examine the results of reports by
14

national governments to the United Nations as to whether the policy objective in their respective
states was to restrict or liberalize further inbound migration. See U.N. Dept. of Econ. and Soc. Aff.,
InternationalMigration Report 2002,
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/publications.htm (follow "International Migration
Report 2002" hyperlink).
76 See HATTON & WILLIAMSON, supra note 34.
77Proxy immigrant quality by the ratio of per capita GDP in the sending versus receiving country.
For the U.S., the index of immigrant quality had dropped close to 50 percent over the period 18701920. In more recent times, immigrant quality has deteriorated much faster, with the result that most
migrants, especially from Mexico, can only compete with natives at much lower effective wage
rates. HATrON & WILLIAMSON, supra note 34, at 10.
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tariff revenue formed an important part of total fiscal receipts of most New
World governments since vast, sparsely populated tracts of land made efficient
tax collection from other sources difficult.78 In addition, migration did not
threaten the national treasuries of most receiving states in the early period since
very little existed in the form of an active social welfare state,79characterized by
a tax and transfer system, until well into the twentieth century.
But in the post-WWII period, if not before, all of these fundamentals
had changed. Lower transport, information and search costs coupled with the
establishment of networks meant that at least in absolute terms, large numbers
of unskilled persons could emigrate to advanced countries. At the same time,
the rise of the social welfare state necessitated large transfers to incoming
migrants, especially at the state level, with corresponding tax implications. 80
None of these changes would mean much however, if governments could safely
ignore most of their average citizens. This was not the case. Many advanced
countries had transformed their political regimes from autocratic forms of
government to relatively liberal, enfranchised democracies that per force
catered, however imperfectly, to the median voter. 81 Faced with wage
competition from low-wage demand migrants, higher tax burdens to support
social transfers to the latter and the existence of at least partially voter-sensitive
governments, it is not at all surprising that states have turned sharply
restrictionist with respect to migration policies in recent times.
IV. POLITICAL SCIENCE CONSIDERATIONS
Widespread existence of voter-responsive liberal democracies is still
very much a recent creation. While countries such as the United States and
Britain (despite being a nominal monarch) have long had liberal democratic
traditions, this has not been the case for many advanced countries of today, and
even less so for the newly-industrialized economies of Asia. A number of
organizations, such as Freedom House, publish data or rankings on political and
78It is reported that Alexander Hamilton observed that customs duties were more important as a
fiscal tool for purposes of revenue than as a means to encourage domestic production of
manufactured goods. HATrON & WILLIAMSON, supra note 34, at 12.
79In the United States, the series of programs initiated between 1933-1937 during the "New Deal"
may be regarded as the beginning of a much larger, activist state characterized by a tax and transfer
system.
80 Estimates for social transfers to migrants and the vies of voters with respect to these are
discussed more. See HANSON, supra note 30 (providing estimates for social transfers to migrants
and the vies of voters).
81 See STANLEY ENGERMAN & K. SOLOKOFF, THE EVOLUTION OF SUFFRAGE T"STITUTIONS IN THE
NEW WORLD, (NBER Working Paper No. W 8512, 2001) (Recent account of the development of
suffrage in the New World.)
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civic freedoms. 82 However, a standard, but exhaustive, source of regime types
for most countries of the world is the seminal work of Charles Boix.83 Thus,
while the inner core European countries such as France, Italy, Austria, West
Germany and Denmark can date their liberal democratic regimes to the mid1940s, other European states such as Greece have had a more checkered history,
with an uninterrupted democratic regime dating only to 1974, with Spain and
Portugal following some two or three years later. A large number of former
Eastern bloc states such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak republics,
Bulgaria and Romania among others can only claim this title beginning in the
early 1990s. In Asia, democratic regimes emerged in South Korea only in 1988,
in the Philippines in 1986 and in Turkey 19 8 3 .84
A potentially fascinating area is the relationship between regime type
and migration and trade policies. Are liberal democratic states more likely to be
pro-migration than autocratic states and what does the data indicate? And, in a
similar vein, is trade protectionism more likely to be observed in autocratic
states or in more broadly enfranchised democratic nations? Issues such as these
have only recently begun to be examined85in political science and the results thus
far, appear surprisingly counterintuitive.
Consider first the relationship between democracy and regime type
(i.e. democracy versus authoritarianism) and migration policy. For a number of
reasons, it is quite likely that authoritarian regimes, particularly those of rich
nations, would adopt more liberal migration policies than their democratic
counterparts. The starting point is to observe that democracies are characterized
by contested elections and their governments are more likely to adopt policies

82 See, e.g., http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=l.
83 See CHARLES Boix, DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM (Cambridge U. Press). (Appendix 2.1 in this
work contains an exhaustive list of countries by regime type, i.e., democratic, authoritarian,
transitional, etc). The standard work on European political institutions in the early 19th century is
Paul Bairoch, Europeantrade policies: 1815-1914, in THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
EUROPE, VOLUME 8 (Peter Mathias and Sidney Pollard eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989).
4 Id.
85 There has been some previous work on the relationship between general economic policies and
regime types, but it has not been particularized to trade and migration policies. See, e.g., RONALD
WINTROBE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DICTATORSHIP (Cambridge Univ. Press 1998), ADAM
PRZEWORSKI ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT (Cambridge Univ. Press 2000); Casey B.

Mulligan et al., Do DemocraciesHave Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?, 18 J.
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 1 (2004),

http://cas.uchicago.edu/workshops/cpolit/papers/mulligan.pdf, NIKOLA MIRILOVIC, REGIME TYPE
AND IMMIGRATION (Univ. of Chicago Working Paper, 2005),

http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/Academic/workshops/pol-econ-papers/mirilovic-immigration.pdf;
KEVIN H. O'ROURKE & ALAN M. TAYLOR, DEMOCRACY AND PROTECTIONISM (NBER Working

Paper No. 12250, 2006), http://www.wcfia.harvard.edulseminars/pegroup/ORourkeTaylor2OO6.pdf.
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reflecting the preferences of the median voter. However, the median voter class
in most countries, rich or not, is likely to consist only of moderately skilled
labor with modest resources compared with the elite class of capital owners or
the landed gentry. As a factual matter, while a few migrants moving into rich
countries are highly skilled (who might well be viewed as capital owners), most
migrants are low skilled and directly threaten the wage levels of the native
median voter. In turn, the latter would be expected to pressure their elected
governments to restrict immigration. This effect is absent in rich autocratic
regimes in which meaningful franchise is limited, if existing at all, and in which
the state's policies are geared to a small elite ruling class that does not depend
upon labor income. Hence, there is little pressure on the government in
autocratic states to restrict immigration to mollify the average citizen.
An additional important reason for the expected pro-immigration
stance of autocracies compared with democratic regimes relates to the existence
of the welfare state. Authoritarian regimes are expected to spend less on social
transfers than their democratic counterparts, since there are few, if any needy
constituents to satisfy. 86 The cost of arriving immigrants (in terms of required
social transfers for medical care, food stamps etc) and the fiscal constraints
upon immigration, therefore, can be easily avoided in authoritarian regimes.
The growth of the modem welfare state in modern times coupled with an
increase in the efficiency of tax collection machinery in recent times, explains
in part, why migration policies in the second half of the twentieth century
became markedly more restrictive than say, fifty years prior to that when there
was no welfare state to any extent. Finally, the inexorable fiscal burden of
today's aging democracies characterized by declining fertility rates is expected
to compound the tax burden further for the working populace. 7 If anything, this
factor may be expected to lead democratic governments to further restrict
migration of persons likely to require social transfers, while encouraging
migration of younger, but highly skilled workers.88
Are these hypotheses empirically validated? Indices of civic and
political freedom are readily available, as indicated previously. Additionally, it

86 See, e.g., PRZEWORSKI ET AL, supra note 85 (Pointing out that this might be one reason why

autocratic regimes are characterized by higher population growth rates than democratic regimes).
Because the social welfare net is limited people need to provide for old age security by having
larger families. Another theme relates to less legitimate reasons for autocratic governments to
expand population and geographical boundaries, i.e. those that refer to concept such as Lebensraum
(living space). Readers will recall this ominous term from the expansionist policies pursued by
Nationalist Socialist Germany in areas to its east.
87 For long run projections of populations in various countries, see, e.g., United Nations Population
Information Network, at http://www.un.org/esalpopulation/unpop.htm.
88 See generally MARTIN ET AL., supra note 45.
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is possible to code Boix's listing of regime types as a binary, dummy variable.
For the years until 1930, the Timmer-Williamson index of restrictiveness of
immigration policy may also be utilized. 90 A possible, but imperfect proxy for
the permissiveness of immigration policy following that time period could be
the share of foreign labor in total domestic employment. 91 Cross-section and
panel data tests performed appear to corroborate the principal hypothesis to a
surprising degree for the last quarter of the twentieth century, i.e. democratic
regimes are more likely to pursue more restrictive immigration policies than
their authoritarian counterparts. 92 These results are also corroborated for the
period prior to 1930 upon examination of the index of immigration
restrictiveness constructed by Timmer and Williamson.93 Thus, the reported
index of immigration policy permissiveness for the major democracies is -0.16
over the period 1850-1930, while for dictatorships, immigration policy was far
more liberal, with the index being 1.8.
Consider next the relationship between regime type and protectionism
of trade policy. Scholarly endeavor in this area too is still very limited. 95 One
focus of inquiry is to examine, in a causal sense, whether broadening the voter
franchise leads to more liberal trade policies (i.e. lower tariffs).96 Extending
voter franchise creates more voters and in most countries, including developed
nations, the median voter is primarily one with labor skills and does not derive
income primarily from capital or from land ownership. Hence, the effect of
democratization is largely determined by whether the average voter stands to

89 See Boix, supra note 83.
- See supra text accompanying note 51.
9' This proxy is imperfect since several Middle Eastern countries have a large proportion of resident
foreign labor and are not generally regarded as being characterized by democratic institutions. This
limitation can be avoided by limiting empirical testing to advanced Western nations.
92 See MIRILOVIC, supra note 85.
93 See TIMMER & WILLIAMSON, supra note 51.
94 See supra text accompanying note 31 (Britain, although a democracy, is an outlier during this
period and pursued pro-immigration policies, due perhaps to the special needs of colonialism and
empire-building).
95 An exception is O'ROURKE & TAYLOR, supra note 85. See also Harry Bliss & Bruce Russett,
Democratic Trading Partners:The Liberal Connection, 1962-1989, 60 J. POL. 1126, 1126-47
(1998); James D. Morrow et al., The PoliticalDeterminantsof InternationalTrade: The Major
Powers, 1907-1990, 92 AMER. POL. ScI. REV. 649 (1998). For more literature on the topic of
democracy and general economic performance, see, e.g., Dani Rodrik and Romain Wacziarg, Do
Democratic TransitionsProduceBad Economic Outcomes?, 95 AMER. ECON. REV. 50 (2005);
TORSTEN PERSSON, FORMS OF DEMOCRACY, POLICY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (CEPR
Discussion Paper No. 4938, 2005).
96 The reverse question of whether encouraging free trade promotes democracy is of interest to
foreign relations scholars and to observers of globalization.
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gain or lose from liberalized trade. While the benefits of free trade in terms of
cheaper access to a wider variety of goods are ubiquitous and dispersed, its
costs are more narrowly imposed upon workers whose livelihood may be
threatened by foreign competition. The vintage trade framework discussed in
previous sections is instructive in this regard. In that framework, it will be
recalled, it is protection that benefits the scare factor or input. Thus, in advanced
labor-scarce economies such as the United States or Canada, the average voter
would lose from liberalized trade and extending democratic franchise would
imply more pressure upon elected governments to satisfy constituents by
restricting trade. By contrast, in the labor abundant economies of the Old
World, land was scarce even in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries and
labor would have preferred free trade, while landed interests would have sought
protection from trade. These observations are not without empirical support. As
discussed earlier, the labor abundant economies of the Old World lowered their
tariff rates much earlier than New World countries.97 More sophisticated
regression results for the period 1870-1914 for a data set including 35 countries
also indicates that the extent of democratic franchise is a significant determinant
of protectionism, once relative scarcities of land and labor in the relevant
countries is taken into account. 98 Finally, when there is a third input, besides
land or labor, such as capital, these effects are no longer as clear cut. Analysis
of the effects of democratization upon trade policy in the context of a more
complex framework has just begun and much remains to be done.
V. INTEREST GROUPS AND PUBLIC CHOICE
In Section III, it was discussed that in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin
trade framework, trade and migration policies and their effects are characterized
by an elegant symmetry. In Section IV, the relationship between types of
regimes and the trade-migration policy stance was analyzed. In this Section, a
more microscopic examination of the preferences of individual voters regarding
trade and migration is utilized. Clearly, it is liberal democratic regimes that are
expected to be responsive to voter preferences, rather than authoritarian
regimes. Thus, the results discussed in this Section are primarily of relevance to
liberal, democratic structures, whether rich or poor. Attitudes or preferences of
median voters in such societies are translated by the governing regime, which
must decide between pro- or anti- trade/migration policies.
Both trade and migration policies lead to identical effects upon returns
to inputs, such as labor and land, the standard framework. Since rich countries

97 See supra text accompanying note 72.
98 See O'ROURKE & TAYLOR, supra note
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are characterized by scarcity of unskilled labor (to use the paradigm utilized
earlier), trade liberalization benefits the relatively abundant input, which is
skilled labor in rich countries. Hence, skilled labor would be expected to be protrade in rich countries and conversely, it would be unskilled labor which would
support trade liberalization in poor countries. Because open migration is a
complete substitute for liberalized trade in the classic framework, as discussed
earlier, skilled labor would also be liberal with respect to migration of unskilled
labor into the rich country. In this case too, relative wages of skilled labor
would increase following liberalization of migration policies. Hence, skilled
workers are complete "globalists" in rich countries, preferring both liberalized
trade and liberalized migration. Skilled labor in poor countries though, would
display the precise opposite preferences. These properties with respect to
attitudes of skilled and unskilled labor in the two countries are conveniently
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
Rich Country
Pro-Trade
Pro-Migration

Poor Country
Anti-Trade
Anti-Migration

Anti-Trade
UAnti-Migration

Pro-Trade
Pro-Migration

Two observations regarding these simple results are in order. First, it
may be easier for states in rich countries to garner support for general
globalization (trade and migration) for the simple reason that skilled and richer
workers would more easily be able to form coalitions and fund government
platforms advocating globalization. This may result from the highly skilled
being both better informed and educated and having access to more resources
for political activism. On the other hand, in poor countries, liberal democracies
attempting to promote globalization are likely to be opposed or blocked by
powerful, well informed and wealthier voters who are decidedly opposed to
globalization in every respect. It is no surprise then, that free trade agendas of
the WTO are often reported to be obstructed or delayed by less developed
countries rather than by the rich, industrialized nations. 99
Second, as in every theoretical construct, caveats are necessary and at
least two are appropriate in this case. To the extent that migration from poor

99 See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Schott, Reviving the Doha Round, INST. FOR INT'L ECON., May 2004,
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=207; see also The WTO underfire,
THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 2003, http://www.globalpolicy.org/soceconfbwiwto/wtoI2003/0918underfire.htm.
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countries consists of skilled labor, in other words there is a "brain drain," the
results noted in the chart would be altered. For now, the emigration of skilled
labor to rich countries would directly threaten skilled natives in the latter. A
more complex setting would recognize that skilled workers in developed
nations are likely to be selective in their migration preferences; unskilled labor
migration, even that which may consist of unlawful migrants, nay be
encouraged or tolerated, while inbound migration of skilled labor would be
disfavored. In addition, even without the complication of a possible "brain
drain," the classic framework is subject to several qualifications as noted earlier.
In particular, factors such as market imperfections or increasing returns to scale
might easily result in trade and migration being complements rather than
substitutes and in fact, the empirical evidence cited earlier points to that
conclusion. 100 If the strict substitutability relationship between trade and
migration is undermined, so would the preference configurations listed in the
summary chart above.
What does analysis of the empirical data demonstrate with respect to
these propositions? Observe first that individual attitudes or preferences can
only be gauged through responses to voter surveys or polls. At least three sets of
cross country voter surveys have been utilized in the little empirical work that
exists; those from the International Social Survey
Programme, the World
0
Values Survey and the European Social Survey.' '
Preliminary empirical testing of voter attitudes toward immigration
appears to be consistent with the classic trade framework, but the latter does not
seem to capture all the determinants of voter attitudes.'0 2 In general, the

100See supra text accompanying note 34.
101For details regarding these international surveys, see www.issp.org;
www.worldvaluessurvey.org; www.europeansocialsurvey.org
'02 Consistency with the classic trade framework means that native voters' attitudes toward
migration depend upon their skill levels relative to those of incoming migrants. See KEVIN H.
O'ROURKE & RICHARD SINNoTr, THE DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL ATrITUDES TOWARD

IMMIGRATION (Trinity College of Dublin Dept. of Econ., Paper No. 20042, 2001),
http://www.tcd.ie/Economics/TEP/2004-papersTEPNo2KOR24.pdf, ANNA MARIA MAYDA, WHO
IS AGAINST IMMIGRATION? A CROSS-COUNTRY INVESTIGATION OF INDIVIDUAL ATTITUDES

TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS (CEPR, Discussion Paper No. 5055, 2005),
http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/amm223/revisedimmpolpref.pdf; Jens Hainmueller & Michael
J. Hiscox, Educated Preferences: ExplainingAttitudes Toward Immigration in Europe (Kennedy
School of Gov't, Harvard Univ. 2005),
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/-hiscox/EducatedPreferences.pdf. Voter attitudes toward trade
policy (protectionism in particular) have also been analyzed. See KEVIN H. O'ROURKE AND
RICHARD SINNOTr, THE DETERMINANTS OF INDIVIDUAL TRADE POLICY PREFERENCES:

INTERNATIONAL SURVEY EVIDENCE (Trinity College of Dublin, Dept. of Econ., Paper 200110,

2001), http://www.tcd.ie/Economics/TEP/2001lpapers/TEPNol0K021.pdf; Kenneth F. Scheve &

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol6/iss1/2
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International Social Survey results seem to indicate that non-economic factors
such as patriotism or chauvinism play a strong part in explaining voters'
attitudes toward migration. Factors such as gender and religion may also have
some impact. 10 3 For labor market participants, there appears to be qualified
support for the classic framework; the high-skilled are less opposed to
immigration than the unskilled. However, contrary to the results described in
the chart, skilled labor everywhere (i.e. in both rich and poor countries) is more
liberal with respect to migration than unskilled labor. In addition, as in the selfselection hypothesis, income inequality also plays a part. °4 When income
distribution in the host country is highly skewed, there is positive selection of
migrants (i.e. migrants have higher labor market skills) and skilled native labor
in receiving countries turns anti-immigrant.
These results parallel those found for individual attitudes toward
protectionist trade policy. 10 5 Again, nationalist sentiments play a large role in
explaining attitudes toward protectionism and better skilled workers, especially
those in rich countries who are likely to be pro-trade. Finally, there is
surprisingly robust evidence of a gender gap in that women tend to be more
protectionist everywhere as compared with men at equivalent skill levels.
The survey results reported above refer to cross-country data. Within a
single country such as the U.S., there also appears to be a fairly wide disparity
in attitudes toward immigration - particularly, illegal immigration - across the
various states. How can this be explained in the face of a national or federal
immigration policy? Models of trade such as the vintage trade framework
discussed earlier are of no application to interstate variations in voters' attitudes
toward immigration within a nation, and the equivalence between trade and
migration as implied by earlier work in trade analysis and relied upon by many
authors, is without relevance. In intriguing recent work, authors such as Hanson
have begun to analyze varying attitudes toward migration across the several
states of the U.S. in terms of three primary factors. First, migrant access to the
state's welfare system (coupled with its tax burden), second, the existing
proportion of migrants in the state's resident population and finally, labor

Matthew J. Slaughter, What Determines Individual Trade-PolicyPreferences?54 J. INT'L ECON.
267 (2001) Anna Maria Mayda & Dani Rodrik, Why are Some People (and Countries)more
Protectionistthan Others?, 49 EUR. ECON. REv. 1393 (2005).
103 For a recent paper dealing with the impact of religious beliefs upon attitudes toward trade, see
PATRICK LAM, RELIGION AND ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL TRADE: DOES RELIGIOUsITY

INCREASE PROTECTIONISM? (Dept. of Gov't, Harvard Univ. Working Paper, 2006),
http://www.iq.harvard.edu/NewsEvents/Seminars-WShops/PEW/FallO6/Lam2OO6.pdf.
'04 This result also finds support in European survey data. See Hainmueller & Hiscox, supra,note
102.
05 See supra text accompanying note 102.
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market outcomes of increased migration. 1°6 Of these, the third factor is central
to international trade models as well and has been discussed above. Specifically,
the higher the skill and education levels of average workers in a state, the less
likely it is that migration of unskilled labor could threaten natives' jobs and
generate anti-immigration sentiment. The other two factors though, are not of
relevance in standard trade analysis, which is conducted at a gross national
level, but were touched upon in an earlier Section.
Space considerations preclude extended discussion; however, the
following observations may be made: Data on attitudes of voters in different
states in the U.S. for large samples is available from the National Election
Studies project, covering 3400 observations over the 1990s.

10 7

There does not

appear to be any such large scale studies for later periods. The statistical
random sample of adults suggests that three factors affect public perceptions
about additional migration; first, access to public assistance services coupled
with the level of state taxes, second, the education level of respondents and
third, the existing size of the state's immigrant population. Contrary to popular
belief, residents of southern border states need not necessarily be more opposed
to immigration than those in more distant states, such as New Jersey. In general,
voters in states with a high proportion of existing migrants, high state taxes and
generous state welfare systems are more likely to be opposed to
additional
0 8
migration, at least for respondents with equivalent education levels.
The effect of education in explaining variations in attitudes toward
additional migration has been mentioned earlier and is relatively straightforward
to rationalize. In general, education is a proxy for labor skills. The higher the
level of education, and hence skills, of residents of a state's population, the less
likely that unskilled labor migration could directly threaten natives' job security
and conversely. States also vary a great deal by their degree of access to state
welfare systems, with states such as Florida, Texas, North Carolina and Virginia
being far less generous than others such as California, Maryland, New Jersey

106 HANSON, supra, note 30.

107Virginia Sapiro et al., National Election Studies Project (Inter-University Consortium for
Political Research, ICPSR Series 2536, CD Rom, Ann Arbor, 1998),
www.chass.utoronto.ca/datalib/major/us-nes.htm.
108Access to state provided welfare became a more important factor after federal welfare for
migrants was sharply curtailed in 1996. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § X, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996); Illegal Immigration Reform and
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § X, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) ("IIRIRI"). (Title
V of the IIRIRI amends and re-incorporates the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act.
The HRIRA barred undocumented aliens from most means-tested public assistance programs and
also limited access of legal immigrants to such benefits for a five year period. Following the federal
initiative, several states restored many of the benefits through state-funded programs).
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and New York. 10 9 At the same time, state tax burdens tend to be relatively high
in California and some northeastern states such as New Jersey as compared with
Texas and Florida. It would not be surprising therefore, that the direct fiscal
impact of additional migrants on natives would be more acute in California than
in Texas or Florida. These propositions appear to be corroborated by recent
empirical studies. l
CONCLUSION
In this article, the relationship between trade and migration policies
was analyzed on a number of levels and across several disciplines. Contrary to
assumptions often made by writers and scholars, including those in the law,
increased trade liberalization does not have predictable effects upon
international migration, which is a far broader and more complex phenomenon.
Nations should pursue independent policies with respect to international trade
and migration, as the United States has already done. There need not be any
hand-wringing over the "missed opportunities" for migration reform in the U.S.
during trade accords such as the NAFTA because of any necessary linkage
between trade and migration. It may be possible in the future, to combine
elements of trade and migration analyses and construct a richer analytical
structure than exists currently. As a policy matter, on the levels of both theory
and practice, there appears to be no need, at this time, to inevitably wed trade
and migration reforms.

'09 See Wendy Zimmerman and Karen C. Tumlin, Patchwork Policies:State Assistance for

Immigrants Under Welfare Reform, Occasional Paper No. 24 (The Urban Institute, 1999).
"0 GORDON H. HANSON ETAL., LOCAL PUBLIC FINANCE AND INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES OVER

GLOBALIZATION STRATEGIES (NBER Working Paper 11028, 2005),

http://irpshome.ucsd.edu/faculty/gohanson/HSSlmm&PF1204.pdf.
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